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Following the experience of the global nancial crisis, central banks around the devel-
oped world have been called to undertake unprecedented responsibilities, and govern-
ments have high expectations that monetary policy can provide solutions to numerous
problems. To some observers, monetary policy is the \only game in town." Exception-
ally low interest rates and unprecedented liquidity provision by major central banks
for several years has eased the burden of adjustment following the crisis. But these
policies do not come without potential costs. In a number of dimensions, monetary
policy has become overburdened and is expected to achieve goals that do not necessar-
ily t in the realm of traditional monetary policy. Despite the crucial position central
banks occupy in public policy, overreliance on monetary policy is bound to disap-
point when the appropriate policy mix for successful resolution of challenges involves
other public policies and institutions. Failing to appreciate the limits of what central
banks can reliably do poses risks. Long-term adverse consequences could outweigh
more immediate and more visible benets. Careful intertemporal calculus is needed
to assess the merits of continuing to overburden monetary policy going forward.
This paper looks at three issues that contribute to the overburdening of monetary
policy beyond what ought to be understood as its primary goal|to preserve and
defend price stability. The rst of these public policy goals is the achievement of full
employment and related nebulous concepts of real economic activity where outcomes
over the past ve years are deemed unsatisfactory in many economies. The second is
the achievement of scal sustainability, facilitating the repair of public sector balance
sheets over time. And the third is the continued preservation of nancial stability,
taking into account the weakened private sector balance sheets in many economies,
and the need to strengthen banking sectors weakened by the crisis, worldwide. For
each of these issues, apparent benets and potential side eects of the unprecedented
monetary policy that has been implemented over the past few years are discussed.
To assess whether monetary policy is overburdened requires an understanding of
1the primary task that monetary policy is entrusted to do. This is to achieve and
maintain price stability over time. One metric for evaluating how signicant the
overburdening of monetary policy may become is framed in terms of the risk that
current policies may threaten the central bank's ability to deliver on price stability in
the future. There can be little dispute that the authority that controls the supply of
the medium of exchange in any economy can also control the general price level over
time and should be responsible for price stability. And yet, over the past century, a
period when monetary policy has been practiced with a at currency, the record of
central banks in achieving and maintaining price stability has been less than stellar.
Episodes of deation and ination have been observed, undermining price stability
and wrecking havoc on real economic performance in the process.
Before the crisis, a consensus had evolved on the main lessons from the previ-
ous experiences and on the basic features of what constitutes good monetary policy.
Among major central banks, a convergence of practices had been broadly observed,
and many of these features had been codied in the practice of ination targeting (IT),
a framework built to emphasize the primacy of price stability as a policy objective.
Placing price stability rst helped central banks to depoliticize the monetary pol-
icy process and gain credibility as independent institutions, key elements that allowed
central banks to contribute towards greater overall stability and eective crisis man-
agement. The success central banks had achieved in anchoring ination expectations
is what enhanced their exibility to respond promptly and aggressively in crisis situ-
ations. In 2008 and 2009, such aggressive action by central banks averted a collapse
of Great Depression dimensions. This was feasible precisely because there were few
questions about the credibility of the central banks to maintain price stability. The
crisis-handling episode highlighted the value of independent central banks focused on
price stability.
Ultimately, overburdening monetary policy may lead to the repoliticization of cen-
tral banking. As more responsibilities are allocated to the central bank, the incentives
for political capture and misuse by governments increase. Overburdening monetary
2policy may eventually diminish and compromise the independence and credibility
of a central bank, thereby reducing its eectiveness to preserve price stability and
contribute to crisis management.
2 Disappointing growth in the aftermath of the
great moderation
A common thread that has raised expectations for monetary policy on a number of
fronts can be identied with the disappointing growth following the rst stages of
the global nancial crisis. In much of the developed world, economic activity seems
anemic compared to the growth prospects the citizens in our democracies had become
accustomed to before the crisis. Figure 1 compares real GDP for the United States,
the euro area, Japan, and the United Kingdom to a trend tted over a decade ending
in 2007Q4. Six years after the turbulence of the summer of 2007, none of these
economies has come even close to retracing the prosperous path suggested by the
trend growth line prevailing before the crisis. Initial hopes of a V-shaped recovery
were dashed long ago. More appropriate questions now seem to be how much lower
the trend of output should be expected to be going forward and how many economies
will join the \lost decade" or the \lost generation" club.
Following the great moderation era, expectations regarding what monetary policy
can achieve in terms of both price stability and economic stability were extremely
high. As a result, averting a repetition of the Great Depression, which central banks
managed to achieve with prompt and decisive monetary policy actions, was hardly
considered sucient success.
The lack of satisfactory growth in the aftermath of the global nancial collapse has
a number of implications. In the industrialized world as a whole, employment growth
has not been sucient to limit unemployment to tolerable rates. In some economies,
historically high unemployment rates among young adults raise the prospect of a lost
generation in the making. Furthermore, government revenues have lagged behind pre-
3crisis long-term projections. Coupled with initial conditions of excessive government
debt, lower growth has exposed a vulnerability of debt dynamics in a number of
countries. In addition, private sector balance sheets have been weakened and banks
remain more vulnerable to write-downs of legacy assets than they appeared to be
during the boom years.
Under these conditions, propping up the economy, facilitating an easing of nanc-
ing costs for governments, and easing the pain of balance sheet repair could be seen as
added goals to monetary policy. The expectation that monetary policy can provide
the solution is overburdening monetary policy.
3 Full employment
There is no question that full employment is a desirable public policy goal. In the
aftermath of the crisis, and in part as a consequence of the disappointing growth in
developed economies, unemployment rates are considered high in many parts of the
world. The experience in the United States, the euro area, Japan, and the United
Kingdom is shown in Figure 2. In the United States, the unemployment rate briey
reached double digits and although it is decreasing the Federal Reserve has acknowl-
edged that it remains considerably above what it considers compatible with price
stability over time. In Japan, the unemployment rate has receded from its crisis
peaks but remains at levels twice as high as what would have been considered nor-
mal not too long ago. In the United Kingdom little improvement has been evident
since the peaks of the crisis. Finally, in the euro area, unemployment rates are not
only unprecedented but in some member states are rising to depression-era levels.
Focusing on Spain and Greece, two of the member states hit hardest by the euro area
crisis, reveals unemployment rates exceeding 25 percent, with the youth component
exceeding 50 percent.
The high, and in some cases, increasing rates of unemployment clearly reect a
major policy failure. Does this make the unemployment rate an appropriate monetary
4policy target? Is full employment an appropriate monetary policy objective, on equal
footing with price stability?
It is undeniable that monetary policy is one of the factors that may inuence
employment in the short run through its broader eects on aggregate demand. How-
ever, other policies should be seen as more important, both in the short run and,
more importantly, in the long run. Consider, for instance, aspects of scal policy
that can provide better incentives for job creation and investment. And consider
structural and labor policies that can greatly enhance the exibility and eciency
of labor markets. In the cases of Spain and Greece highlighted earlier, for example,
the greatest tragedy of the current record high unemployment rates is not primar-
ily a reection of inadequate aggregate demand but of the deeper failure to reform
dysfunctional elements in labor markets that ideally should have taken place before
the crisis. The failure to correct these sources of vulnerability before the crisis added
rigidity to labor markets and magnied the impact of the crisis on the rate of un-
employment. Although monetary policy could help to alleviate the resulting pain by
inducing somewhat faster growth in aggregate demand, it cannot solve the underlying
problems.
One way to see this is by comparing gures 1 and 2. The disappointing growth
following the crisis, seen in gure 1, has similar patterns in the four economies shown.
And yet, the patterns of unemployment, including the long-term average of the rate
of unemployment but also its movement over the business cycle, dier greatly from
one economy to another.
Central banks cannot ensure the sustainable creation of high-quality jobs. Central
banks cannot generate sustainable growth and increase the level of potential GDP.
These are important public policy concerns that should be seen as belonging squarely
in the sphere of other policies for which governments are responsible.
During the great moderation period, when monetary policy is considered to have
been generally successful, this separation of responsibilities was usefully highlighted
in the ination targeting framework (IT), developed rst at the Reserve Bank of New
5Zealand in the late 1980s.1 IT was practiced by a large number of central banks over
the past quarter century. It has been practiced explicitly by a number of central banks
that self-describe as ination-targeting central banks, but it has also been practiced
implicitly by other central banks, such as the Federal Reserve since 1979, the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) since its creation, and the Bundesbank before the creation
of the euro area. The success can be summarized as ensuring a credible nominal
anchor, whose importance has been demonstrated repeatedly through history.
The IT practice has been impressive in helping central banks to achieve an en-
vironment of well-anchored ination expectations around the central banks' price
stability objectives. This has been crucial for ensuring the credibility of central banks
when exceptional measures had to be taken during the crisis.2
But what is IT and why has its practice, be it explicit or implicit, contributed
to the success of monetary policy? Macroeconomic model-builders can design model
economies where monetary policy can do well not only in achieving price stability
but also in simultaneously achieving full employment. But this does not capture the
essence of IT. Rather, IT regimes specify that the only primary objective monetary
policy should have is price stability. Subject to achieving price stability, to the extent
possible, policy can help in other dimensions but only to the extent that the primacy
of price stability is not compromised in the medium term. This focus on a single
objective is what has provided the clarity and simplicity that allows the monetary
authority to be a credible defender of price stability in a symmetric manner, and it
protects the central bank from doubts that it could be captured in the pursuit of other
objectives. In this way, indirectly, monetary policy can also prove more eective in
the attainment of other goals, for example in ensuring that employment is generally
1Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) oer an early exposition of the merits of ination targeting. The
volume edited by Bernanke and Woodford (2005) oers an evaluation of the theory and evidence.
The recent volume edited by Bordo and Orphanides (2013) highlights the evolution of central banks
in this direction following the experience of the Great Ination. King (2012), and Svensson (2013),
oer recent policy perspectives on the practice of ination targeting in light of the crisis.
2Orphanides and Williams (2005) show how the well-anchored ination expectations resulting
from IT practice contributes to greater stability.
6close to the economy's natural rate. (Orphanides and Williams, 2005).
Capturing this salient characteristic of IT practice in terms of a model has not
been straighforward. It may be convenient to endow the central bank with a quadratic
loss function with multiple objectives, price stability, full employment, maximum
output, nancial stability, etc. But this methodology fails to capture the salient
characteristics of the framework. Actually, the multiple-goal way of thinking about
policy and tradeos seems to describe better the monetary policy regime that was in
place in many economies before IT was adopted. As we know, that earlier era was
one associated with failure, a failure that IT was created to address.
The case of New Zealand, the pioneer of ination targeting, is instructive. A
decade after it was adopted in New Zealand, Don Brash, the Governor who rst
implemented the new approach explained the problem the RBNZ faced before IT. He
recalled that prior to the mid-eighties New Zealand had one of the worst ination rates
in the OECD, exceeding 10 percent per year for virtually a whole decade. He went
on to ask why this was the case. Wasn't low ination one of the aims of the Bank?
Apparently, this was the major problem. Price stability was merely one of multiple
goals. Brash explained the multiple-goal oriented approach pursued by the Reserve
Bank before adoption of ination targeting as follows: \The legislation under which
we operated required us, in formulating our advice, to have regard for the ination
rate, employment, growth, motherhood, and a range of other good things" (Brash,
1999, p. 36). He then went on to explain how ditching the multiple-goal approach
in favor of recognizing the primacy of price stability helped New Zealand get out of
that disastrous period.
The main distinguishing characteristic of ination targeting is that it puts price
stability rst. It is not a multiple-goal targeting framework, notwithstanding the
convenience of multiple-goal formulations for modelling purposes.
Central bank mandates written for IT, including those of central banks in the
European Union, are clear on the primacy of price stability. Thus, for the ECB:
\The primary objective ... shall be to maintain price stability." The treaty goes on
7to recognize that other objectives that the central bank can help to attain follow:
\Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the
general economic policies in the Union ..." The hierarchical nature of the mandate
is a distinguishing characteristic of ination targeting. This is in variance to legal
mandates written in earlier times, say from the 1950s to the 1970s, that were unduly
inuenced by the Great Depression and paid insucient attention to the primacy of
price stability over other desirable goals.
An example may be instructive to highlight both the dierences in the legal man-
dates and how IT was implicitly practiced successfully in the United States, even
before IT was formally introduced in New Zealand. According to the Federal Re-
serve Act, the Federal Reserve should \promote eectively the goals of maximum
employment and stable prices".
Literal interpretation of this language can be a recipe for trouble. Indeed the
literal interpretation of this mandate describes well the experience of the United
States, the failure to preserve price stability and the lack of economic stability during
the 1970s. One might ask, how was policy practiced in the United States during the
Volcker-Greenspan era, from 1979 on, a period that was very successful in achieving
price stability.
The answer is that looking back, both Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan eectively
interpreted the legal mandate of the Fed as if it put price stability rst. That is, the
Fed was implicitly acting as an ination targeting central bank.
Consider for example how Chairman Greenspan explained the success of policy
in the post-1979 period. In an address in 2004 he explained this was achieved by:
\maximizing the probabilities of achieving our goals of price stability and the max-
imum sustainable growth that we associate with it" (emphasis added). The key, in
this interpretation, is that by focusing on price stability, the Federal Reserve could
ensure that the real economy could grow along its maximum sustainable growth path
that is associated with \it," that is with price stability, even though it need not be
explicitly identied nor targeted by the central bank.
8One may ask why take this roundabout path to help the economy achieve max-
imum employment over time? The answer is our lack of knowledge regarding the
appropriate real targets, concepts such as the natural rate of employment and un-
employment and potential or natural output. For example, as Chairman Greenspan
noted back in 1994, \while the idea of a national `threshold' at which short-term
ination rises or falls is statistically appealing, it is very dicult in practice to arrive
at useful estimates that would identify such a natural rate." He went on to conclude:
\In light of these uncertainties, I do not think that any one estimate of the natural
rate is useful in the formulation of monetary policy."
More recently, the Federal Reserve has introduced explicit mention of the rate
of unemployment as a guide to its unconventional measures during the crisis. The
December 2012 statement noted that the FOMC \currently anticipates that this
exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long
as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent."
It has been suggested that this form of forward guidance may be helpful to provide
additional policy accommodation in light of the zero lower bound and concerns that
the rate of ination is too low. A prolonged period of accommodation may indeed
be warranted to ensure that ination rate does not undershoot the ination objective
for a prolonged period. However, in light of the symmetry of the ination objective
in the IT framework, such a prolonged period of accommodation would be expected
if ination were too low, even without any reference to the rate of unemployment.
A pertinent paragraph from a speech Chairman Volcker made recently highlights
the tensions of misinterpreting the recent changes in communication as getting the
Fed away from its recognition of price stability as primary to the achievement of other
objectives:
\I know that it is fashionable to talk about a `dual mandate'|that policy
should be directed toward the two objectives of price stability and full
employment. Fashionable or not, I nd that mandate both operationally
9confusing and ultimately illusory: ... The Federal Reserve, after all, has
only one basic instrument so far as economic management is concerned|
managing the supply of money liquidity. Asked to do too much|for
instance ... to square continuously the hypothetical circles of stability,
growth and full employment|it will inevitably fall short. If in the process
of trying it loses sight of its basic responsibility for price stability, a matter
which is within its range of inuence, then those other goals will be beyond
reach." (Volcker, 2013.)
Chairman Volcker's unease about the risk of reinterpretation of the mandate is note-
worthy. It should also be noted, however, that the December FOMC statement said
that the Fed considers its current stance appropriate as long as \longer-term ina-
tion expectations continue to be well anchored," a key feature of IT practice and
suggestive that the FOMC is aware of the tension. It is thus unclear whether the
introduction of an explicit reference to an unemployment rate in recent FOMC state-
ments justies concerns regarding a deviation from the successful interpretation of
the Fed's mandate during the Volcker-Greenspan, although the tension this language
created appears to be unhelpful.
The euro area oers another example of the risks that would have been associated
with the targeting of imperfectly measured real variables. Figure 3 presents some
estimates of the output gap for the euro area, as produced by the IMF. This is the
dierence between the notional concept of potential output and actual output. In
theory, if potential output could be measured accurately, the output gap could be a
useful policy target. The output gap should be about zero, on average, and should
help policymakers identify periods of overheating, when it would be positive, and
periods of underutilization, when it would be negative. In the chart these periods of
positive and negative output gaps can be clearly identied for the history of the euro
area, as seen from the estimates prepared this Spring. But in real time, the estimates
did not provide the correct signals. Since 1999, the real-time estimates of the output
10gap produced by the IMF in the spring of each year have been negative. Almost half
the time, the sign of the real-time estimate of the gap was wrong, when evaluated from
today's perspective. It should be stressed that this is not a problem specic to this
particular example that uses IMF estimates. The problem is endemic to traditional
methods of dening full employment and normal output in real time (Orphanides and
van Norden, 2002). Perhaps the inclusion of broader conceptual denitions, such as
the nancial cycle examined in Borio, Disyatat, and Juselius (2013), may improve
reliability going forward, but I remain doubtful.
A summary conclusion to draw, based on the available evidence and historical
experience, including the success of explicit or implicit IT practice, should be that
monetary policy contributes best to the desirable public policy objective of full em-
ployment by focusing on price stability. Overburdening the central bank by requiring
explicit targeting of a real variable such as employment or output would likely do
more harm than good.
4 Fiscal sustainability: The threat of scal domi-
nance
A second area where the risk of overburdening monetary policy is evident regards scal
sustainability. The challenge can be seen in gures 4 and 5 that show the evolution of
gross and net debt-to-GDP ratios, respectively, for the United States, the euro area,
Japan, and the United Kingdom. Not seen in these gures is an additional related and
well-known problem, that concerning unfunded implicit liabilities for future ageing
related expenditures (pensions and healthcare).
The enormous challenge faced by Japan is clearly evident and puts in perspec-
tive the talk about unsustainability in the other three economies. That said, in the
aftermath of the crisis, scal challenges are present in all four economies. Although
the problem is known, governments have yet to adjust the spending path in a man-
ner consistent with their taxing power and long-term growth prospects. Lack of
11political consensus, in various forms, complicates the adoption of sensible long-term
plans that could ensure simultaneously long-term scal sustainability and short-term
support for economic growth. Sound scal policy is not the responsibility of cen-
tral banks. However, in the history of central banking there are numerous examples
where governments used central banks to nance their spending, invariably leading
to a debasement of the currency. Monetary policy can powerfully facilitate the repair
of public sector balance sheets over time in a number of ways. The temptation to
overburden monetary policy is great, as is the risk of eventual scal dominance.
The crisis has led central banks around the world to atten risk-free yield curves
and massively expand the supply of liquidity. Short-term nominal interest rates are
eectively zero in all four economies. The level of liquidity per unit of nominal GDP
(the Marshallian K of the monetary base) is at historic highs. This is a feature of
unconventional monetary policy at the zero bound and as such might not necessar-
ily raise alarms. However, at the zero bound, monetary and scal policy become
blurred. High-powered money and risk-free short-term government debt become in-
distinguishable. When viewed in conjunction with the unresolved scal challenges
facing the governments, concerns about the scal implications of the current and
future stance of monetary policy are dicult to avoid.
There is a way to implement unconventional monetary policy and enlarge the
central bank balance sheet with a smaller risk of inviting scal dominance. The ex-
pansion could be engineered through the purchase of foreign assets instead of through
the purchase of domestic government bonds (or their acceptance for long-term repo
operations). The Swiss National Bank oers an example.
Monetary policy can facilitate the nancing of government debt in a number of
ways. Low interest rates directly benet all borrowers with access to cheap credit,
including governments. The large purchases of government debt associated with quan-
titative easing provide another almost-as-direct benet to governments, and one that
is not available to private borrowers. The greatest risk for monetization of the debt
may be associated with the inationary consequences of a delayed withdrawal of the
12exceptional monetary accommodation now in place. Such a delay may not be in-
tentional on the part of the central bank. Nonetheless, the resulting upward price
level adjustment that would follow a delay in withdrawing policy accommodation is
as real if unintentional as if intentional. Accepting the risk of overshooting the de-
sired price level path may be a necessary by-product of the massive unconventional
monetary policy necessary to help the economy recover. But the situation creates
the temptation for governments to attempt to capture the monetary policy process,
as monetizing the debt may prove politically much easier than the alternatives as a
means of restoring scal sustainability.
Even absent these concerns, the availability of cheap credit may have signicant
adverse eects on the incentives for political authorities to correct scal problems.
When the central bank provides all the nancing a government needs at near zero
cost, it is easier to postpone dealing with a problem rather than risk the short-term
political cost that would be associated with any solution. The risk of facilitating this
postponement, of course, is that the scal problem only gets bigger when not tackled
in a timely fashion.
The euro area presents additional special challenges. The crisis the euro area
has been going through is sometimes referred to as a sovereign debt crisis. Figure
6 shows the path of gross debt to GDP for the six largest euro area member states,
representing collectively about 90 percent of the euro area economy. The gure shows
that the deterioration from the crisis is forecast to persist, except in Germany. But
it also shows that the historical paths of debt for Spain and Italy, both of which
have been under signicant pressure in terms of their cost of nancing in the past
three years, compare very favorably with that of Japan, where the government can
renance its debt at near-zero cost and that of Belgium in an earlier period, before
the euro area existed. Spain in the euro area, also compared favorably during the
crisis to the UK, part of the European Union but outside the euro area, suggesting
the presence of a deeper problem with the functioning of the euro area.3
3De Grauwe (2011) oers a comparison of Spain and the UK in this context.
13One of the most critical consequences of the euro area crisis is the divergence in
the cost of nancing of government debt. Figure 7 shows the evolution of the 10-year
government bond yields for the four largest member states. Without getting into a
detailed discussion on the causes of the euro area crisis, we can easily understand the
risks for the European Central Bank in light of the pressures facing some member
states in the euro area. The Treaty prohibits monetary nancing and prevents the
central bank from serving as a lender of last resort to individual governments in the
euro area. It is well understood that the resolution of the euro area crisis is in the
hands of the governments of the member states. But what if market tensions appear
to threaten the euro area construction and governments need more time to imple-
ment solutions? The ECB may be the only institution that has the power to prevent
a collapse. On various instances during the crisis, the ECB engaged in purchases of
the debt of selected member states through its Securities Market Program (SMP)
or provided liquidity to the banking system that could be used for such purchases.
Since last year, through the creation of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
program, it has created a framework for additional, potentially unlimited purchases of
government debt, subject to conditionality that would result from intergovernmental
negotiations. ECB monetary policy decisions of this nature can have a soothing eect
on markets with immediate visible eects. This can be seen in gure 8 where the four
vertical lines correspond to the announcements regarding SMP (May 10, 2010 and
August 7, 2011), the 3-year Long-Term-Renancing-Operation (LTRO) (December
8, 2011) and the OMT (September 6, 2012). The ECB has the capacity to buy more
time for the governments by intervening when the threat of immediate collapse be-
comes too high. However, these monetary policy actions may inadvertently encourage
governments to postpone resolving the crisis (Orphanides, 2013). Unavoidably, the
ECB nds itself in the middle of a political crisis with a highly uncertain outcome.
In the short run, the temptation to see the central bank step in and solve sovereign
debt sustainability problems can be great. Overburdening monetary policy by ex-
pecting that it will facilitate restoring scal sustainability and controlling tensions in
14sovereign markets is a clear case where current monetary policy has signicant and
potentially unpleasant intertemporal political economy implications.
5 Financial stability
The third area with the potential for overburdening monetary policy concerns the
role of monetary policy in maintaining nancial stability. Two sides with somewhat
dierent considerations are of interest|the preventive phase, aiming to avert crises,
and the repair phase, following a crisis. What can and what should monetary policy
do when nancial imbalances appear and asset price misalignments are suspected?
That is, what is the role of a central bank in reducing the likelihood of the occurrence
of a crisis? And what is the role of monetary policy during the adjustment phase
after a crisis erupts?
Regarding crisis prevention, the global nancial crisis has rearmed that ensuring
price stability is not sucient to avoid major nancial crises and maintain nancial
stability. Most of the time price stability and nancial stability may be thought
of as reinforcing each other and no general tradeo exists between them. Avoiding
large deviations from price stability, such as high and volatile ination or deation
contributes to nancial stability. However, too narrow a focus on price stability
over short horizons may prove counterproductive for maintaining nancial stability.
Greater short-term stability in prices may raise the risks of an asset boom or bust
down the road, leading to instability.
Under these circumstances, the pertinent tradeo may be viewed as one regarding
a comparison of the risks to price stability over shorter horizons against tail risks
at longer horizons. For example, persistently high credit growth may be observed
together with price stability. If the high credit growth is suspected of contributing to
the build up of an imbalance, as was observed in real estate markets in some countries
before the crisis, and if somewhat tighter monetary policy could eectively contain
this imbalance, then tighter monetary policy could be considered appropriate even
15if it leads to a short-run rate of ination somewhat below the central banks' ideal.
Tighter monetary policy under these circumstances may reduce the probability of
a crash of an overheated market, which might be followed by an economic slump
and the risk of deation at a longer horizon. Under such circumstances, accepting
a somewhat lower ination rate in the short run should be seen as worthwhile to
balance the risks regarding price stability over time. This could be interpreted as
an example of the \leaning against the wind" strategy (Borio and White, 2003).
The appeal of this approach, however, depends sensitively on the ability of central
banks to detect the incipient imbalances and the eectiveness of monetary policy to
counteract them. Regarding detection, assessing fair values for asset prices may be as
hard as measuring natural rates in real time, although recent analysis on the \nancial
cycle" suggests some potential for progress (Borio, 2013). Regarding the eectiveness
of monetary policy, considerable uncertainty remains. With respect to the housing
boom observed in the United States before the crisis, for example, Greenspan (2010)
argues that increases in the federal funds rate would have been insucient to contain
the imbalance, as mortgage rates were only loosely related to the stance of monetary
policy during the period.
If adjusting the stance of monetary policy is not very eective, however, other
tools should be considered. Ideally, macro-prudential levers should be available to
the central bank to contain the buildup of imbalances and contain the risk of a
potential nancial disturbance. In this regard, the global development of institutions
involving central banks with the power to implement macro-prudential measures is
promising, although it may take decades to assess the eectiveness of such measures
in practice. Regarding banks, the overall risks of future crises can be reduced by
tightening regulatory requirements so as to demand more and higher-quality capital
than was suggested by the Basle II framework, and by reducing the scope for banks to
use risk-weighting to evade stronger capital buers. These micro-prudential measures
could lead to considerably stronger capital positions, and it has been argued that the
cost of moving in that direction may be small (Admati and Hellwig, 2013). In light of
16the promise of micro- and macro-prudential supervision measures, it remains unclear
what additional role monetary policy should have in reducing the risk of nancial
crises, although the case for \leaning against the wind" is stronger than it appeared
before the crisis (Bean et al., 2010).
A more direct risk, potentially threatening the credibility and independence of a
central bank, is associated with nancial stability considerations during the cleanup
phase of a crisis. As we have observed during the current crisis, a massive monetary
policy easing may be required to avert a collapse of Great Depression proportions.
The associated provision of liquidity at near zero interest rates has a number of
characteristics that could become unpleasant side-eects for the central banks.
One such characteristic is associated with the role of the central bank as the
lender of last resort. In the global crisis central banks stepped into that role in
an unprecedented scale. In addition, for some nancial markets considered critical
for stability, central banks acted as market-makers of last resort. The provision of
liquidity can ease the burden of deleveraging in the aftermath of a crisis, and soften
the blow the real economy might otherwise suer.
Provision of emergency liquidity assistance can ease liquidity shortages even in
conditions of severe stress. However, during a crisis, the valuation of the collateral
pledged against the provided liquidity is harder to assess with precision and a shortfall
in liquidity may become dicult to distinguish from an underlying solvency problem.
If a solvency issue were to appear, the continued provision of liquidity for extended
periods (and at very low interest rates in the aftermath of a crisis) could potentially
mask a solvency problem.
Since solvency concerns have scal implications, providing liquidity during a crisis
could risk the central bank acquiring a scal role with distributional eects that it
would ordinarily wish to avoid. In a systemic crisis, the robustness of the existing
bank recapitalization and resolution framework and its scal backstop can become
critical considerations and constraining factors for the central bank. If the central
bank assesses that a scal backstop is weak or insucient and judges the economic
17consequences of one or multiple bank failures to be too severe, it may be indirectly
forced to continue to support a bank by providing ample liquidity even after its sol-
vency becomes doubtful. In the extreme, a politically captured central bank could
succumb to government pressure to provide emergency liquidity assistance to an in-
solvent bank, eectively undertaking a scal operation by stealth and helping the
government hide the problem from public view.
In eect, through its liquidity provision, the central bank may become the backstop
to the nancial system and may implicitly assume the scal risks associated with
this role. In these circumstances, continued provision of liquidity at very low rates
could nurse a sick bank until it becomes healthy. The central bank can facilitate the
strengthening of the capital position of a weak bank through retained earnings. If
macroeconomic conditions justify providing liquidity at very low rates for a suciently
long period, a bank whose solvency was in doubt could strengthen its capital position
suciently to be considered healthy again, thus avoiding the prospect of resolution.
An unpleasant side-eect of such a sequence of events, however, is that it may
subordinate the primary function of monetary policy to the nancial stability concerns
resulting from a weakened banking sector. If macroeconomic conditions require an
increase in interest rates before the banking system is nursed back to health and the
scal authorities are unwilling or unable to serve the role of a nancial backstop,
the central bank may be faced with a dilemma: Continue to keep interest rates low
to avoid banking problems at the cost of higher ination, or raise interest rates and
accept the risk of one or multiple bank failures and their economic consequences.
Monetary policy always has some distributional and some scal consequences.
Under ordinary circumstances these consequences may be relatively small and of sec-
ondary importance compared to the macroeconomic consequences of monetary policy
actions on economic growth and aggregate price developments. In the absence of a
well-dened and suciently strong scal backstop, however, post-crisis cleanup could
turn the provision of liquidity at very low rates into a mechanism for recapitalizing
banks. Without workable alternatives, this may create doubts about the willingness
18of the central bank to exit an environment of exceptionally accommodative mone-
tary conditions when macroeconomic conditions would have warranted such a policy
change. Such doubts could compromise the credibility of the central bank.
6 Conclusion
When other policies fail, when other policies are hard to implement, when other
policies are politically challenging, it may be appealing to ask central banks to use
monetary policy to achieve broader goals, to make up for the gaps in what other
institutions and policies should do. The risk is that pursuing multiple objectives
simultaneously brings the central bank back into the realm of politics. This can
compromise its independence and risk losing sight of price stability.
The result of expecting too much of monetary policy and demanding that mone-
tary policy do more than focus on price stability rst, is that it may lead to backsliding
to earlier unhappy experiences. Backsliding to the days when governments asked cen-
tral banks to deliver \growth, motherhood, and a range of other good things" with the
result that central banks failed even in the one task monetary policy can achieve|to
preserve price stability.
Monetary policy is a poor substitute for other policies needed to restore economic
balance around the world. Monetary policy is not a substitute for structural and
labor market policies needed for sustainable job creation and growth. It is not a
substitute for scal, pension, and healthcare reforms that are needed to ensure scal
sustainability over the long run. It is not a substitute for stronger capital buers
in challenged banking systems nor for shortcomings in micro- and macro-prudential
supervision. And it is not a substitute for the political and governance reforms that
may be needed to restore the functioning of a monetary union facing an existential
crisis.
The desire to push the envelope of what central banks can do and aim to design
monetary policy frameworks that provide solutions to multiple problems and improve
welfare is admirable. However, expectations must be managed to better reect reality.
19The limits of our knowledge about how central banks can best contribute to society
and the limits to what monetary policy can do must continue to be acknowledged
and respected. Despite the impressive repower in their balance sheets, magic bullets
are not to be found in central bank arsenals.
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Notes: Real GDP and linear trend t over decade ending in 2007Q4.
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Notes: The Spring 2013 series shows the historical output gap estimates from the
latest IMF WEO (Spring 2013). The real-time series shows, in each year, the output
gap estimate from the IMF Spring WEO of that year.
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27Figure 6
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Notes: Gross debt as a percent of GDP, data and forecasts from IMF Spring 2013
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Ten-year government bond yields in the euro area
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Five-year CDS in the euro area
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